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I. Introduction

The Federal Role in Managing the
Nation’s Groundwater
By John D. Leshy1

Groundwater is increasingly important
to the nation. Groundwater withdrawals for
irrigation have tripled in the last half-century. Moreover, as an ever-growing segment
of the population get their drinking water
from public entities (62% in 1950; 85% today), the portion of public water supplies
derived from groundwater has increased
from 26% to 37%.2
Groundwater nevertheless remains a
subject about which “misinformation, misunderstanding, and mysticism”3 abound,
and the law that governs it is murky.4 Most
of the governing law is state law, for the
separate states have generally assumed primary responsibility for managing the
nation’s groundwater.5 But “primary” does
not mean “exclusive.” The federal government has a large amount of authority in this
area, and has on occasion exercised it, albeit
with mixed results, as this article will discuss.
1. Harry Sunderland Distinguished Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
This paper grew out of remarks delivered in June
2004 at the 25th summer conference of the Natural Resources Law Center at the University of
Colorado School of Law. I benefited from able
research assistance by Chris Giovinazzo, a third
year student at Harvard Law School, and able
editorial advice from Avinash Kar.
2. SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN
2000, CIRCULAR NO. 1268, at Trends in Water Use,
1950-2000 (released March 2004, last revised May
2004), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circ/
2004/circ1268 (last updated 13 May, 2004); see
also JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D.
LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES 345 (3rd ed. 2000).
3. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973) [hereinafter WATER
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE].
4. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 343-459.
5. Id. at 345.
1
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State law generally has not been adequate to the task of managing the nation’s
groundwater. Professor Glennon has recently
documented many emerging problems,
mostly stemming from inadequate state laws
and management.6 As population growth,
drought and the specter of climate change
are all bringing water management under
new scrutiny across the country, a fresh examination of the national government’s role
with respect to groundwater seems appropriate. The first part of this essay identifies
the various ways the federal government can
influence groundwater management. Building on examples of successful federal interventions, the second part suggests ways it
should exercise that influence.

A. Federal reserved water rights

II. Federal Authority Over Groundwater

Lower court post-Cappaert decisions on
whether the federal government has reserved
groundwater in particular instances have not
been consistent. The Wyoming Supreme
Court found no reservation in its Big Horn
decision,13 justifying its conclusion with a
decidedly weird explanation. It first said that
“the logic which supports a reservation of
surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater.”14 It then said, without further explanation, that because no final judicial decision had accepted this logic in a holding (the
Supreme Court’s dodge in Cappaert having
wiped out the Ninth Circuit’s decision), it
would affirm the trial court’s ruling that
groundwater had not been reserved here.15

Generally speaking, the federal government does not lack for constitutional authority to regulate or otherwise influence groundwater management and use. The Supreme
Court’s 1982 decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska7
made clear that the Commerce Clause gives
Congress “affirmative power . . . to implement its own policies concerning [groundwater] regulation. . . . Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Congress
has the power to deal with it on that scale.”8

6. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER
PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS (2002).
7. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
8. Id. at 953-54.
9. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908);
see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963)
(expressing “no doubt about the power of the
United States under these clauses to reserve water
rights for its reservations and property”).

2

The Commerce Clause and the Property Clause both furnish the national government with the authority to create federallaw-based property rights in groundwater
under the so-called Winters doctrine of federal reserved water rights.9 The issue that
occasionally arises is whether, in any given
situation, this authority has been exercised.
In its only brush with such a question, the
Court in 1976 decided, in Cappaert v. United
States,10 that the federal government had exercised its authority to reserve water in what
everyone agreed was an “underground pool.”
Oddly, the Court shrank from characterizing
that water as groundwater as the Ninth Circuit had,11 calling it instead surface water.12

10. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
11. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313,

317 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. 426 U.S. at 142.
13. In Re General Adjudication of Big Horn River System,
753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
14. 753 P.2d at 99-100.
15. Id.

More recently, the Arizona and Montana
Supreme Courts, using more persuasive reasoning, have disagreed with Wyoming.16
Further, Congress itself has acted on the assumption that at least some Indian tribes
have federally reserved rights to groundwater, because a number of congressionally
approved settlements of Indian water rights
have expressly included groundwater as well
as surface water.17 Sometimes Congress has
demonstrated this assumption by doing the
opposite, i.e., by expressly authorizing the
pumping of groundwater from inside a federally protected area for use outside the reservation under certain conditions.18
Professor Dan Tarlock concludes that
while the issue is “technically open,” in his
judgment “little, if any, doubt remains that Indian tribes have groundwater as well as surface water rights.”19 It is perhaps a little less
clear whether this is true for other kinds of federal reservations such as national parks.20
Regardless of whether the federal reserved water right extends to groundwater in
any given situation, the Cappaert decision establishes the very important principle that “the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of
surface or groundwater.”21 The water Cappaert
was pumping was clearly considered ground-

16. In Re General Adjudication of Gila River System, 195
Ariz. 411, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom. Phelps Dodge v. United States, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000);
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Stults, 312 MONT. 420, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Timbisha Shoshone Homeland
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat. 1875 (2000);
Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-34, 117 Stat. 782 (2003).
18. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460z-9(a) (2000 & Supp. II
2003) [Oregon Sand Dunes National Recreation Area].
19.A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES, § 9.41, at 9.80-9.80.1 (5th ed. 2002).
20.See Section IIC2
21.426 U.S. at 143.
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water under Nevada water law,22 and the Court
curtailed his pumping to protect the superior
federal water right in the “underground pool”
that was the pupfish’s sole habitat.23 At the
least, then, the Court has made clear that the
federal government can create federal water
rights that trump groundwater pumping lawful under state law. Put slightly differently,
when federal reserved rights exist, federal law
provides for a realistic accounting of interconnections between groundwater and surface
water, even where state law does not.24
B. Federal “non-reserved” water rights
The federal power to assert rights in
groundwater does not have to be exercised
through a conventional federal reserved
Winters right. For example, Congress provided federal protection for the water — including the groundwater — that sustains a
complex sand dunes ecosystem in the Great
Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act
of 2000,25 not in association with a federal
reservation of land, but through a “non-reserved” federal water right.26 This is a right
whose substantive contours are defined by
federal law, but which must be perfected
through the processes of state law.27 I have
elsewhere explored the differences between
this and a federal reserved water right.28

22.See id. at 133-35.
23.Id. at 132.
24.See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 443-46; John

D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where
Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657,
733-38 (1988).
25.Pub. L. No. 106-530, 114 Stat. 2527; 16
U.S.C. § 4210hhh-7(b)(2)(A) (2000).
26.For more on this, see John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs:
A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 271 (2001).
27.Id.
28.Id.
3
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C. Questions about federal water rights
While the national government has the
authority to create and protect property
rights in groundwater as a matter of federal
law, a number of important questions remain unanswered. For example:
1. Does the existence of a federal reservation of groundwater depend on whether
groundwater is needed to fulfill the purpose
of the reservation?
2. Could the answer be different in Indian and non-Indian contexts? The needs of
Indian and non-Indian land reservations might
not be congruent. Non-Indian federal reservations need groundwater mostly for in situ
uses, to preserve surface waters and the ecosystems that depend on them. Indian reservations may need groundwater not only for
these uses, but also for irrigation, municipal
and industrial purposes. Dean Charlie Meyers
suggested, for example, that a national park
may have no reserved right in groundwater to
meet its needs, while an Indian tribe does.29
3. If the federal right extends to groundwater as well as surface water, but both sources
need not be relied upon to satisfy the federal
need, should one be preferred over the other?
In a rare judicial exploration of this issue, the
Arizona Supreme Court suggested looking first
to surface water to satisfy Indian water needs.30
4. Where federal and non-federal rights
co-exist in a non- or minimally recharging
aquifer, how should the aquifer water be
apportioned? Does the federal right forestall any new pumping that could interfere
with the federal reservation, or should the
finite groundwater in the aquifer be shared
between federal and non-federal users on
29. See Charles J. Meyers, Federal Groundwater
Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 377, 385-89 (1978).
30. See Gila River, 195 Ariz. 411, 420-21, 989
P.2d 739, 748-49 (2001).
31. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-97 (1963).
4
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some sort of equitable basis? More than
four decades ago, the Supreme Court rejected the states’ argument for equitable
apportionment of surface water between
federal and non-federal users, saying a federal land “reservation is [not] so much like
a State that its rights to water should be
determined by the doctrine of equitable
apportionment.”31 Would the Court reach
the same result in the groundwater context?
5. What if non-federal pumping were
already underway when the federal reservation was created? The Cappaerts had begun pumping only after the federal reservation was created.32 Would the result be the
same if they had been pumping first? What
if the impact of their pumping on the underground pool was not apparent when the
federal reservation was created, but became
noticeable only some time later?
Will the answer be governed or influenced
by state law? If so, the picture becomes even
more cloudy. In a state applying the prior appropriation doctrine to groundwater, the sequence of appropriation may be a major factor in reconciling the federal right with rights
created under state law. Priority is, however,
irrelevant in determining rights among those
who withdraw groundwater for use on the
overlying land pursuant to the groundwater
doctrines followed in many states, e.g., the rule
of capture followed in Texas,33 the American
“reasonable use” rule followed in parts of Arizona and many other states,34 and the correlative rights doctrine followed in California.35
In these jurisdictions (which comprise a significant majority of American states), a latecomer may not be disadvantaged. Therefore,
if the United States reserves land that needs
32. See 426 U.S. at 133.
33. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America,

Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
34. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 371-77.
35. Id. at 377-80.

groundwater for in situ use, it can make a credible case for some protection under state law,
even against pumping initiated by others prior
to the reservation.36
6. Perhaps the most important of the
unanswered questions is whether the United
States will have the political courage to assert
federal rights to curtail or prohibit pumping
under state law in controversial situations. In
the late 1990s, a well-connected private entrepreneur proposed to pump groundwater
near the Mojave National Preserve in southern California, and market it to urban users in
metropolitan Los Angeles.37 Although that
scheme, referred to as the Cadiz project, was
eventually abandoned when the Metropolitan Water District decided not to buy the water, others are on the drawing board. For example, Las Vegas has announced plans to
pump and transport into the City groundwater from near a National Wildlife Refuge several miles northeast of the City.38 Will the federal government assert a federal reserved right
to protect groundwater necessary to maintain
the Refuge, even if it might limit one means of
supplying water to the fastest growing metropolitan area in the country? In such situations,
how realistic is it to expect the federal government to aggressively protect the national interest in the Refuge? If it does not, there is
considerable doubt that third parties can persuade the courts to intervene.39
36. See discussion, infra Section II.D.
37. See generally Cadiz Groundwater Storage

and Dry-Year Supply Program (web-site sponsored
by
Cadiz,
Inc.),
at
http://
www.desertwater.com/ (last updated Dec. 2003).
38. See generally the longer-range plans of
the Southern Nevada Water Authority, available
at http://www.snwa.com/html/news_pubs_
wr_plan.html (last visited August 21, 2004).
39. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (federal
courts are reluctant to interfere with federal agency
law enforcement decisions); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v.
Reno, 56 F. 3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same, specifically
with regard to assertion of water rights claims on
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In hindsight, Cappaert was a rather easy case:
The facts were clear about the impact of pumping on the federal interest, an endangered species was involved,40 and the rancher commenced
pumping after the federal government had reserved the water in the pool. Where the impacts
are less clear, the federal interest less certain,
and the forces behind groundwater pumping
more politically powerful, will federal law be
brought into play, especially now that the Supreme Court has turned rightward and become
more deferential to state water law?41
D. United States’ claims of rights to
groundwater under state law
Many states apply groundwater doctrines — principally American reasonable
use and correlative rights (but not prior appropriation) — that give overlying landowners superior rights to groundwater against
those who pump from the same source but
seek to export the water, if the overlying
landowners can show injury.42 If an aquifer
lies under both federal and non-federal
lands, state law might allow the United
States to protect the waters associated with
its lands against export schemes such as
those in the Cadiz or Las Vegas situations.
I have suggested above that, especially outside the Indian context, the federal interest
will often be to protect groundwater in situ to
support surface ecosystems and water flows.

behalf of tribes); cf. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004) (suggesting federal courts will scrutinize federal land management agencies’ alleged failure to claim adequate
water rights to protect a national park).
40. The Endangered Species Act itself was not
involved, even though the pupfish had been listed
under the Act, a fact noted by the lower courts but
not the Supreme Court. See United States v. Cappaert,
375 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (D. Nev. 1974); United States
v. Cappaert, 508 F. 2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1974).
41.See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
42. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 371-80.
5
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State law may be unclear on the extent
to which it recognizes rights to groundwater in situ, for storage or ecological purposes,
and whether ecological harm from groundwater depletion is the kind of “injury” that
state law would recognize as sufficient to
curtail groundwater pumping for export.
Answering these questions in the affirmative may require stretching state law concepts of injury, and the attitude of the Wyoming Supreme Court in the Big Horn case43
illustrates how some state courts may be
reluctant to interpret state laws to accommodate and protect federal interests.
E. Other federal regulatory policies
may affect groundwater
The most prominent of these are found
in the Endangered Species Act,44 already
the trigger for several major disputes involving groundwater pumping,45 and the Clean
Water Act.46
F. Federal water contracting policies
may affect groundwater
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
captures, stores, and delivers, under contract, large volumes of irrigation, municipal
and industrial water throughout the West.
The “rights” to this water are determined by
an untidy amalgam of federal contract law,
federal water law, and state water law.47 A
good deal of this federal reclamation project

43. See 753 P.2d 76; see also discussion, supra
Section II.A.
44. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
45. See, e.g., the Edwards Aquifer saga, recounted in SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 367, 577-82.
46. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. I 2002).
47. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 651-89.
48. See Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wash.
2d 109, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984)
49. Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 505-07
(1924). The Court did not make clear whether
that result was dictated by state or federal law
6
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water ends up as groundwater through seepage.48 Are there federal rights in this federally enhanced groundwater?
The question, again, is not one of authority, but whether the federal government
has chosen to exercise it. The Supreme
Court long ago decided that the United
States could recapture and reuse seepage
water in a federal reclamation project.49
Sometimes the federal government does
claim rights in the enhanced groundwater,
as in the Quincy-Columbia Basin in Washington, and the courts have agreed.50 But
the United States has not always made such
claims. Indeed, some of BOR’s contracts
expressly disclaim any right to groundwater
recharged as a result of federally built and
operated projects.51
Many BOR contracts go even further.
At the behest of the agricultural interests it
serves, BOR has often included a provision
in its contracts that any land irrigated with
groundwater which “reaches the underground strata as an unavoidable result of” irrigating lands with BOR-supplied water is not
subject to the acreage limitations of federal
reclamation law. 52 Reclamation law generally limits a single farmer’s use of federally
subsidized water to a maximum of 960
acres;53 the contract provision effectively
allows farmers to irrigate an unlimited
amount of acres with such water, simply by

or both. Although Ide involved seepage which
was recaptured while it was surface water, the
same result could obtain with groundwater.
50. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 437-46;
Jensen, 102 Wash. 2d 109; Flint v. United States, 906
F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. For a review, see SAX ET AL., supra note 2,
at 443-44.
52. See id. at 444 (emphasis added).
53. See 43 U.S.C. § 390dd, 96 Stat. 1265;
Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 657 (1989).

pumping it from an aquifer replenished by
the federal project.
G. Federal land use policies may affect
groundwater
Groundwater use that is otherwise lawful
under state law may also be affected by federal
policies regarding the use of federal land.
Groundwater extraction, storage and
recovery projects sometimes require rightsof-way across federal lands. The federal
government usually has broad discretion to
grant or deny such rights-of-way. Numerous court decisions make clear that the federal government can condition such permits
on steps being taken to protect federal interests.54 It seems clear that the federal land
manager can condition permission to use
the federal land upon an agreement by the
permittee to limit groundwater pumping that
is otherwise lawful under state law.
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H. Interstate issues
The federal common law of equitable
apportionment, along with compacts and
statutes that apply to interstate watercourses, may also operate to restrict use of
groundwater in a variety of circumstances.56
For example, the Special Master in Arizona v.
California indicated at one point that he was
prepared to enjoin additional groundwater
pumping in New Mexico where its effect would
be to deplete surface water flow earmarked
for senior water right holders in Arizona.57
To sum up, the federal government has
potentially enormous power — through a
variety of means — to influence groundwater management throughout the country, and
especially in the West where much land is
federally owned and many stream systems
contain federal reclamation water projects.

While the law is clear, the politics are
complicated, and such conditions can be
controversial. This is the groundwater version of the “bypass flows” controversy that
has, for nearly two decades, plagued Forest
Service efforts to use its land use permitting authority to protect and restore surface
water flows in the national forests which
have been depleted by non-federal diversions taking place on federal land under
state water law.55

III. The Federal Role in Groundwater
Policy

54. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76. See
also a recent case thoroughly exploring this issue
(albeit in the context of surface water rather than
groundwater), Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
55. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76; GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, JR.& JOHN D. LESHY,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW 549-52 (5th ed. 2002).
56. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 692-771,
esp. at 733, 753-54.
57. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note

3, at 244. The Commission’s report is discussed
more fully below in Section III.B.
58. The material in this section is drawn from
a variety of sources, including SAX ET AL., supra
note 2, at 343-459; WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE,
supra note 3, at 230-293; CHARLES E. C ORKER ,
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
NTIS No. PB 205-527 (1971) (background study
for the National Water Commission); and from
personal observations derived from my work on
these issues over more than three decades.

A. Before 196858
With the advent of the New Deal, the
national government assumed new responsibilities in many areas of American life, substantially reworking federal-state relations.
But groundwater remained generally subject to state control, for several reasons:
First, large-scale extraction of groundwater
was not possible until the development of
high-speed centrifugal pumps and rural
electrification on the eve of World War II.

7
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Groundwater’s variability also cut sharply
against national rules. Moreover, groundwater rarely had an obvious interstate dimension that invited national involvement
— which is how the federal government assumed responsibility for such major surface
water projects as Hoover Dam. Finally,
groundwater management just lacked political sex appeal, compared to taming a wild
river through some colossal engineering
achievement.
Nevertheless, more unwittingly than by
design, federal policies put in place during
this era — including those promoting rural
electrification and cheap hydropower, and
providing federal subsidies to a variety of
agricultural crops — would soon powerfully
promote groundwater development. 59
These federal policies did not displace state
control over how groundwater was used.
This is not to say, however, that states
did very much actual management of the
groundwater resource. To the contrary, with
few exceptions, the states’ approach was
laissez-faire — to treat groundwater more
or less as a commons, to stand aside and
let pumpers have as much as they wanted.
In most places, state law purported to give
landowners rights to pump groundwater
without regard to its sustainability, or to its
effect on rights to use surface water. As they
worked in practice, these state groundwater doctrines may be better understood as
rules of liability than as property rules of
ownership.60 In any event, these doctrines
created an illusion of unlimited private
property rights in groundwater, when in fact
the available supply of groundwater and
associated surface water was not sufficient
to satisfy such rights.
59. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 440.
60. For a discussion of this idea, see Eric

Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An Outdated
Principle Beyond Its Time, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
87, 90 (2002).
8
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Hindsight shows this was a big mistake.
Allowing unlimited pumping and characterizing it as a property right, when combined
with promotional federal policies, produced
predictable results. Pumpers made large
investments in operations that depended
on groundwater, and they came to think they
had open-ended, unlimited private property
rights in the groundwater resource. The concealed nature of the resource contributed to
this problem of inflated, unrealistic expectations. A farmer or industrial concern might
readily appreciate the difficulty of gaining exclusive control over a river that flows through
many separately owned parcels of land. Such
appreciation may be harder to come by when
water is extracted from the bowels of the earth,
even though the aquifer from which the water
is extracted may extend under many separately owned parcels of land. These unrealistic expectations fueled the notion that the
government had limited power to regulate the
withdrawal of groundwater.
As large-scale groundwater mining began to occur after World War II, federal policy,
which was already promoting such mining,
became even more wrong-headed. Far from
encouraging the states to take the longer
view and manage for sustainability, the federal government actively encouraged
groundwater mining. It even invented a new
way to subsidize it, by granting a federal tax
depletion allowance to pumpers of water
from the giant Ogallala Aquifer in the High
Plains, which had little natural recharge.61
And it built projects to “rescue” groundwater miners, with additional federal subsidies.
This postponed, but could not avoid, the
inevitable day when limits on groundwater
had to be reckoned with.
61. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 30. The IRS
ruling was triggered by a court decision, United
States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1965).

B. A Turn to Greater Federal Involvement
Federal policy makers eventually began
to wake up to the error of their ways. A pivotal moment came in 1968, when Congress
authorized federal construction of the multibillion dollar Central Arizona Water Project,
or CAP.62 The project that Arizona got was
not the project it originally envisioned,
which was to use imported Colorado River
water to expand irrigated acreage in central
Arizona. Instead, the CAP was expressly
designed to be a rescue project, and no
more, for Congress prohibited CAP water
from being used “directly or indirectly for the
irrigation of lands not having a recent irrigation history,” except for Indian land.63
Moreover, Congress wanted this to be
Arizona’s last federal rescue project. By 1968
it was becoming clear that the water of the
Colorado River had been over-allocated. The
Colorado was the sole source of supply for
the CAP, and both the national government
and the other Basin interests wanted to
make sure Arizona would not be coming
back for more Colorado River water or another federal bailout because it had not
been willing to control groundwater mining.64 Therefore the CAP legislation specifically forbade the Secretary of the Interior
from delivering CAP water to any area in
Arizona that did not have “adequate” measures in place to “control expansion of irrigation from aquifers affected by the irrigation in the contract service area.”65 This was
a radical departure from past practice: For
62. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000). The material
on the events described here is drawn from a
variety of sources, including SAX ET AL., supra note
2, at 692-705 and the other sources cited there;
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1987); and STEVEN
C. SCHULTE, WAYNE ASPINALL AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 177-226 (2002). As Associate Solicitor of Interior for Energy and Resources in
1977-80, I was a bit player in some of these events
and draw upon some personal observations.
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the first time ever, Congress insisted on effective state groundwater law reform as a
price for getting federal largesse.
This was a rather miraculous bit of progressive policy-making. Even more miraculously, the federal ultimatum worked. True,
it remained in the background for ten years
as the CAP canal snaked its way across the
Arizona desert to the booming cities of
Phoenix and Tucson. Arizona obviously was
not eager to bring up the subject, and other
Basin states (perhaps figuring they would
be next to feel this kind of federal prod to
reform their groundwater management) appeared to forget about it. Then two things
happened: Cecil Andrus became Secretary
of the Department of the Interior in 1977,
and Bruce Babbitt became governor of Arizona in 1978.
In a bit of drama orchestrated with the
new Governor, Secretary Andrus announced
he was indeed prepared to enforce the congressional mandate to regulate groundwater pumping. Arizona would have to abandon its Wild West laissez-faire approach to
groundwater if it wanted the Secretary to
open the spigot of the two billion dollar CAP.
Babbitt then almost literally locked key representatives of the state’s big water users in
his office for many weeks of hard bargaining until they produced the 1980 groundwater code — a detailed, complex, command-and-control reform that was anything
but laissez faire.66 All this from a state that
had always stoutly resisted any meaningful
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(a) (2000).
64. See SCHULTE, supra note 62.
65. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(c) (2000).
66. This is not to suggest the federal ultima-

tum was the only factor, for an Arizona Supreme
Court decision that made it difficult for cities to
obtain groundwater for urban growth also played
a key role. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 427-29;
Desmond Connall, A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313.
9
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controls on groundwater pumping, that not
too long before had thrust free market
apostle Barry Goldwater on the national
scene, and that in that same year, 1980,
voted overwhelmingly for Ronald Reagan —
whose anti-federal regulation views were
well-known — for President.
One other important development in
the evolution of national groundwater policy
occurred in 1968. It grew out of a congressional debate over whether water might be
imported into the Colorado River system
from the Columbia-Snake River system. Led
by members of Congress from the Pacific
Northwest, opponents of importation prevailed. While the legislation Congress enacted called on the Secretary of the Interior
to conduct “full and complete reconnaissance investigations for the purpose of developing a general plan to meet the future
water needs of the Western United States,”
it prohibited “any Federal official” from undertaking any study of “any plan for the importation of water into the Colorado River
Basin from any other natural river drainage
basin” outside of Arizona, California, Colorado and New Mexico.67 As a consolation
prize to import proponents, Congress seized
upon a favorite tactic — it set up a commission.68 While this National Water Commission grew out of the fight over importation,
it addressed water policy across the board,
including groundwater.
The Commission’s 1973 Report was
aptly titled Water Policies for the Future. It called
for much more attention to be paid to economic efficiencies (leading it to focus on
project costs, water pricing, and water mar67. 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000). The original prohibition was for ten years but it was extended
once, to 1988, and then was permitted to expire, apparently because the Pacific Northwest
members of Congress decided the big water
project era was over and the risk had passed.
68. National Water Commission Act, Pub. L.
10

Volume 11, Number 1

keting); equity (leading it to call for greater
attention to Indian water rights); and environmental quality (leading it to pay serious
attention to the environment — which was
just beginning to become a household word
in the early 1970s).
On groundwater specifically, the Commission began by condemning the “misinformation, misunderstanding, and mysticism” that surrounded the subject.69 It
worked hard to demystify the topic, tersely
expressing its key findings:
The three principal problems of
ground water law, management,
and administration are: (1) integrating management of surface
water and ground water, (2) depletion of ground water aquifers at
rates exceeding recharge (often
referred to as the “mining” of
ground water), and (3) impairment
of ground water quality. Lesser,
though important, problems
are . . . accelerating collection of
ground water data together with
fuller and more meaningful interpretation of it, aquifer protection,
and subsidence.70
On all three points, the Commission rather
gently criticized the miserable failure of most
states to reform their laws and policies to
address these problems. For example, on
the first problem, the report noted that “only
recently and in only a few water-short Western States has an effort been made to coordinate the administration of the integrated
surface water-ground water supply.”71 On

No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868; see SCHULTE, supra note
62, at 204-07, 214.
69. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note
3, at 230.
70.Id. at 232.
71.Id. at 233.

the second, it noted that “[o]nly a few States
have squarely faced the . . . problems caused
by ground water mining.”72 On the third, the
Commission’s criticism extended to the national government as well; the report noted
that little attention had been paid to groundwater pollution even though it has “long-term
and sometimes irreversible effects . . . [and]
the subject is of national concern.”73
Although many of the Commission’s
recommendations called simply for reform
of state laws and policies, at several points
it recommended that the federal government be more involved. For example:
Recommendation No. 7-6: Any
Federal agency seeking authorization of a Federal water
project for an area having a usable ground water aquifer
should describe and evaluate
the ground water management
programs of the area.
Discussion — Congress should be
apprised of the status of ground
water management programs in
areas in which the desirability of
authorizing Federal water projects
is under consideration. Federal
agency reports on proposed water
projects should contain appropriate descriptions and evaluations of
such ground water management
programs so the Congress can
judge whether or not and the extent to which progress in effective
conjunctive management of
ground water and surface water is
being made and, thus, the extent
to which that option is adequately
considered as an alternative to proposed Federal projects.74
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id. at 243.
74. Id. at 238.
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Recognizing that groundwater mining
was a “national problem,”75 the Commission
openly wrestled with various alternative
ways of dealing with it:
The Commission has given extended thought to the role of the
Federal Government in discouraging ground water mining and promoting prudent aquifer management. One possibility is preemptive Federal regulation. The Commission rejects this alternative because it does not think the problem is capable of a single solution
and questions the likelihood of a
Federal agency developing multiple solutions adaptable to a variety of local conditions.76
At the same time, the Commission was
clear-eyed about the federal government’s
“direct financial interest in ground water
mining when a region suffering from overdraft seeks a rescue operation.”77
Based on this reasoning, the Commission made the following recommendations:
Recommendation No. 7-8: The
President should issue an executive order directing Federal
agencies charged with responsibility of water resource planning and development to include
in all pertinent studies and
project proposals a description
of the ground water resource,
whether or not ground water is
being mined and, if so, the regulatory and management regime
applicable to it, together with an
evaluation of that regime.
Recommendation No. 7-9: Con75. Id. at 242.
76. Id.
77. Id.
11
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gress should scrutinize closely
the economic justification for
water supply projects designed
to supply supplementary water
to areas that have mined ground
water and should examine the
circumstances giving rise to the
project proposal including the
presence or absence of ground
water regulation and management, and their operation.78
The Commission also recognized the
potential seriousness of groundwater pollution, and acknowledged an important federal role there too. It called for (1) more
funding for the U.S. Geological Survey to
study and monitor groundwater quality; (2)
the federal government to take into account
state and local efforts to protect pertinent
groundwater quality in considering any federal water supply project; and (3) federal
clean water legislation to cover groundwater pollution through the same “regulatory
regime and enforcement techniques,” applied to surface water.79
Finally, the Commission addressed
what it called the “central and pervasive
problem” of the lack of basic pertinent information about groundwater, including its
availability and its connection with surface
flows.80 It noted that data are “relatively difficult to obtain, costly, and usually less precise than comparable data about the water
78. Id.
79. Id. at 243-44 (Recommendations Nos. 7-

10, 7-14, 7-15).
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Recommendations Nos.7-16 through 7-20).
83. Id. (Recommendation No. 7-19).
84. The Chair, Charles Luce, had been a prominent
attorney from Washington State, general counsel to an
Indian tribe, Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, and Undersecretary of the Interior under
Stewart Udall; the other six members were Howard Appling
12
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that is visible at the earth’s surface.”81 The
Commission did not mince words: it called
the data shortcomings “potentially disastrous,” and made rather detailed recommendations for how the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) should be adequately funded to
gather specific data on significant aquifer
systems and report the results to Federal,
State and local officials (including, specifically, state and federal courts).82 The Commission also advocated that the national
Water Resources Council (since
deauthorized) use the USGS data to “formulate recommendations for improved ground
water management practices and transmit
its recommendations to appropriate Federal, State, and local officials.”83
In short, the Commission proclaimed
that the era of promoting the use of groundwater without adequate regulation was, or
ought to be, over, and that more active, effective management of this vital resource was
necessary. It called on States to do a much
better job of managing and regulating, and
while it rejected a top-down federal approach
(except to protect ground water quality), it
called for federal policies that actively promoted rather than postponed solutions to
these problems. It was a remarkably able and
prescient report, and it is noteworthy that
westerners with substantial experience in
state-level water management (in Arizona,
Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Washington)
dominated its membership.84 Coming on the
(a former Oregon state official who had worked in the
agricultural industry), James Ellis (attorney from Seattle
with extensive experience in state and local government
issues), Roger Ernst (former Arizona state engineer, water commissioner, land commissioner and water district
official), Ray K. Linsley (Engineering Professor at Stanford
and consultant to state and federal agencies), James E.
Murphy (Montana attorney active on water issues at the
state and interstate level), and Josiah Wheat (Texas attorney and state and water district official). WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at iv-v. Its staff and consultants included many westerners experienced in state
water management systems. Id. at vii.
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heels of the 1968 CAP legislation, it pointed
the way toward better groundwater management, with the federal government playing a
constructive role.
C. The Current Scenario
It is, frankly, a pity that the Commission’s recommendations have mostly
not been implemented. Delay in addressing these issues is costly, as economies increasingly rely on unsustainable water practices and expectations harden in resistance
to change. As the Commission itself noted
with respect to the integration of ground
and surface water management, “when the
coordination effort comes late - after an
economy has been developed in reliance on
two different legal systems for one integrated
supply — achieving coordinated administration is very difficult.”85
But the Commission’s recommendations remain viable. This was demonstrated
when, a quarter-century later, another congressionally chartered blue-ribbon commission revisited western water management.
The 1998 report of this Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission essentially
updated and refined much of the work of its
predecessor, reaffirming its key conclusions.
Among other things, the new Commission
recommended that Congress “require
state . . . regulation of [groundwater] withdrawals as a condition of federal financial
assistance for the construction of new water storage projects.” 86 It also asked Congress to “scrutinize proposals for water
projects in areas with groundwater mining,
especially noting the presence or absence
of groundwater regulation and manage85. Id. at 233.
86. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION,

WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE
NEXT CENTURY, p. 6-23 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Id.

FOR THE

ment.”87 Finally, it called on all federal agencies with responsibilities in the water area
to be aware of “associated groundwater resources and their current management, including . . . rates of depletion.”88
Now, fast-forward five more years, to the
Bush Administration’s major water policy pronouncement, Water 2025.89 It contains some
nice rhetoric and has some sensible, constructive elements. But on groundwater, the Administration is basically missing in action.
For example, Water 2025 does not identify groundwater depletion as a priority water
management problem in the west. It does
not mention the problem of ignoring connections between groundwater and surface water. And it does not include improved groundwater management or replenishment in its tool
kit. Indeed, its only statement on the subject
is the tepid promise that the U.S. Geological
Survey “will enhance groundwater monitoring . . . in critical areas of the West.”90
One does not have to look too far for
an explanation of the Bush Administration’s
modesty. Its policy is replete with statements
like these:
−

“Since 1866, federal water law and
policy has deferred to states in the
allocation and administration of
water within their boundaries.
This policy will be honored and
enhanced by Water 2025.”

−

Decisions to address “the complex
water needs of the West . . . cannot and should not be driven from
the federal level.”

−

“Water 2025 can only work if it is

89. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Water
2025: Providing Water for the West, at http://www.doi.gov/
initiatives/water2025 (last updated June 21, 2004).
90. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025:
PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 18, available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water2025
.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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implemented in accordance with
state law.”91
While the Administration at least acknowledged that the federal government “built
many of the water storage and delivery systems in the arid west,”92 its virtual silence
on groundwater, and its zeal to respect state
law, assumes that states will solve groundwater problems by themselves. Experience
does not support this assumption.
Groundwater mining, for example, is
fundamentally created by and tolerated
through state law. The artificial bifurcation
between groundwater and surface water is
a problem solely created by state law, because it is not tolerated in federal law, as
the Cappaert decision illustrates.93 Arizona’s
pre-CAP experience is typical - when states
are given absolute supremacy over groundwater management, the result in many
places will be continued relentless mining
of groundwater and the destruction of dwindling supplies of riparian habitat so that,
over time, groundwater depletion reaches
crisis proportions, both for water supply and
for aquatic ecosystems. There are many
other examples.94
Although groundwater in much of the

91. Id. at 1-3.
92. Id. at 11.
93. See, discussion, supra Section II.A.
94. Consider the State of Wyoming’s failure to

address the problem of disposing of vast quantities of
groundwater that are pumped in coal bed methane
extraction. GARY BRYNER, COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST 13-16 (Natural Resources Law
Center, University of Colorado School of Law, 2002),
available at http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/
publications/CBM_Primer.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2004). See also, JOSHUA SKOV & NANCY MYERS, EASY MONEY,
HIDDEN COSTS: APPLYING PRECAUTIONARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
TO COALBED METHANE IN THE POWDER RIVER BASIN (Science
and Environmental Health Network, June 2004), available at www.sehn.org/pdf/cbm.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004). This report estimates that coal bed methane
14
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United States is not being managed very
well, states will continue to have a primary
role in its management. Unilateral, topdown federal solutions are no more likely
to be adopted or to work here than in any
other aspect of water policy. But as the
National Water Commission recognized, the
federal government has a constructive role
to play. The Arizona experience shows how
it can encourage and sometimes even require states to do better. Unfortunately,
Water 2025 seems to ignore that approach,
making it a missed opportunity to improve
management of a vital natural resource.
Water 2025 also reflects federal fiscal
shortsightedness. Again, the National Water Commission saw the problem clearly,
recognizing that groundwater mining is of
national concern, not so much from the fact
that the resource may be ultimately depleted, although that is a problem, but from
the fact that the depletion is unplanned, and
the future is not provided for. As disaster
approaches, the Federal Government is
likely to be implored to step in with a rescue project, to furnish a supplementary water supply at taxpayers’ expense to save an
economy established in reliance on imprudent overuse of groundwater.95
development could pump 40 million acre-feet of
groundwater, causing a several hundred-foot drop in
the water table and affecting 5000 water wells. Consider also Nevada’s limited and mostly ineffectual response to huge groundwater withdrawals associated
with hard-rock mining — a one million acre-feet drawdown in the Humboldt Basin in Nevada alone. One,
the Barrick Goldstrike mine, pumps about 80,000 acrefeet a year from its pit, and when it backfills after mining ceases it will likely severely reduce surface flows in
the Humboldt River to create the second largest reservoir (after Lake Mead) in Nevada. See, e.g., SAX ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 361-62.
95. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at
232. Of course, even when a state has a groundwater management scheme in place that adequately
addresses how shortfalls in supply should be allocated, it may still come to the federal government
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IV. An Appropriate Federal Role

a large proportion of the country.96

Arizona is managing its groundwater
much better than it was before the federal
government helped engineer its reform. The
Arizona experience suggests the right path
for federal policy — to use a mixture of information-gathering, carrots (federal dollars), sticks (federal claims of water rights
and enforcement of federal regulatory laws
like the Endangered Species Act), and persuasion (conditions in federal reclamation
contracts and federal land use permits) to
move the states toward more active management of groundwater.

In much of the West, the federal government operates a giant plumbing system
of storage and delivery projects.97 This system has great potential for facilitating
groundwater banking, which is emerging as
an essential tool for progressive water management in many areas.98 Moreover, the
federal government’s power to contract for
the use of this water, including when it
seeps into aquifers, gives clear opportunity
to promote better management of groundwater, including restoration of associated
stream systems.99

As the National Water Commission
emphasized, an essential step is simply
gathering information. The U.S. Geological
Survey operates about 7200 stream-flow
gauges around the country, and in my experience, its support role in this regard is
widely accepted. But the states have never
advocated for — indeed, they may have quietly resisted — a comparable federal role in
groundwater. I believe this is because of
their concern that federal information-gathering will ultimately lead to federal displacement of their primacy over groundwater.
This extreme short-sightedness has resulted
in a great disparity in the amount of federal
dollars invested in assessing and monitoring aquifers compared to their importance
to the nation in supplying drinking water for

The assertion of federal claims to
groundwater may sometimes lead to negotiated settlements that improve management
of groundwater and related surface water with
benefits to non-federal as well as federal interests. Around the Lummi Indian Reservation north of Seattle, where Indians and a
rapidly growing number of non-Indians
pump groundwater from a common pool,
and salt water intrusion from nearby Puget
Sound threatens all, federal claims to groundwater on behalf of the Indians can help forge
a solution to the common problem by forcing non-Indians to the negotiating table.100
Elsewhere, federal claims to groundwater may
help spur states to manage water in a way
that acknowledges the interface between
ground and surface water.101

for assistance. Thus, Idaho agricultural interests
have been exploring how they might obtain federal
funds to ameliorate pain caused by applying Idaho’s
priority system to curtail groundwater pumping by
farmers in order to protect senior water rights in
surface springs and the Snake River. See Jennifer
Sandmann, Idaho Debates Idling Farms for Spring Water,
THE TIMES-NEWS (Twin Falls, Idaho), August 19, 2004
(on file with West-Northwest) (originally accessed at
http://www.magicvalley.com); Rocky Barker, Idaho
Farmer May Be Asked to Dry Up 100,000 Acres, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Sept. 3, 2004, Local Section, at 6.
96. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, available at http://water.usgs.gov/
programs.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2004).

97. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 651-57.
98. See id. at 431-59. See also several reports on con-

junctive use prepared by The Natural Heritage Institute,
found at http://www.n-h-i.org/Projects/WaterResources/
ConjUse/ConjunctiveUse.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
99. Id.
100. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 862-63.
101. See the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
the Gila River Adjudication case, supra note 16, recognizing a
federal reserved right to groundwater, and its closely related decision, In re General Adjudication of Gila River System,
198 Ariz. 330, 334, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073 (2000), recognizing a
test for defining sub-flow of surface water that “comports
with hydrological reality, as it is currently understood.”
15
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Sometimes the federal prod may not
be needed. Colorado has developed, without overt federal intervention, a sophisticated system of managing groundwater and
surface water in an integrated way that puts
it miles ahead of any other western state.102
The threat of salinity intrusion and aquifer
contamination along Southern California’s
coastal plain has led to some remarkably
sophisticated groundwater management
there, again without significant federal involvement.103 (But California is schizophrenic — in its great Central Valley there is
precious little management of groundwater.104 ) Land subsidence around Houston
from unregulated groundwater pumping led
to some modest legal reform, at least on
paper, of Texas’s wild and woolly rule of capture — the “absolute ownership in the landowner” principle of groundwater law.105
But looking across the entire landscape, progress without federal prodding is
more the exception than the rule. In most
places the federal government is needed,
as in Central Arizona, to be a catalyst for
constructive change in groundwater management. Its tough stance there was driven
by interstate politics, uncharacteristic federal fiscal prudence, and progressive leadership. A more common rationale for more
recent federal intervention in state groundwater management has been to preserve
biodiversity. Consider the Edwards Aquifer
in south-central Texas. Even as pumping
102. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 361, 401-402.
103. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 446-59; See

WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
104. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 458.
105.See Friendswood Development Co. v. SmithSouthwest Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978); SAX
ET AL., supra note 2, at 367, 430-31.
106.See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 57782; GLENNON, supra note 6, at 87-97.
107.Editorial, A Solution on Platte River Fight, DENVER
16
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from this vital supply (the sole source of water for the Nation’s ninth largest city, San
Antonio) increased dramatically, Texas stubbornly resisted regulation. The aquifer discharges into some springs which support
several endangered species listed and protected under federal law. Litigation to enforce that law eventually, if slowly, led Texas
to begin to come to grips with managing the
aquifer to protect not only the species’ future, but also that of one of its great cities.106
Much the same thing is happening on
the Platte River, where endangered species
concerns are driving Colorado, Nebraska and
Wyoming toward better management of the
River and its associated aquifers. A recent
editorial in the Denver Post underscored the
importance of the federal government driving the solution, and noted that the endangered species concerns are forcing Nebraska
to stop “ignor[ing] the physical reality that
excessive pumping of shallow aquifers near
a river reduces the river’s water levels . . .
[which is a] big problem on the Platte.”107
A final example involves the San Pedro,
a small desert river in southern Arizona, pleasant enough to the untrained eye but spectacular to biologists and bird-watchers - a remnant
of pre-settlement Arizona, before groundwater pumping and surface diversions dried up
nearly all Arizona’s major rivers.108 The San
Pedro corridor is one of the largest surviving
expanses of southwestern cottonwood-willow
riparian forests, and is important habitat for
POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at B7, available at 2004 WL 59330297.
See also Bureau of Reclamation, Platte River Recovery Program EIS, at http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/groundwater/
allprojects/platte_river.htm (last updated July 1, 2003).
108. The facts referred to in the discussion of the San
Pedro are derived generally from GLENNON, supra note 6;
see also COMM’N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, RIBBON OF LIFE: AN
AGENDA FOR PRESERVING TRANSBOUNDARY MIGRATORY BIRD HABITAT ON THE UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (1999) [hereinafter RIBBON
OF LIFE], available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/documents/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=283 (last visited Nov.
14, 2004).

millions of migratory birds, making it a worldclass showcase of biological diversity. Birder’s
Digest named the area the premier
birdwatching site in the country.109
It is an international stream, arising in
Mexico and flowing northward into Arizona
where it eventually joins the Gila River. The
San Pedro sits atop a large aquifer that contains perhaps 50 million acre-feet of water.
Nearby are an army base, Fort Huachuca, and
one of Arizona’s fastest growing cities, Sierra
Vista. The City, the Army, farmers, and others all pump groundwater. The pumping aims
a loaded gun at the stream-flow and the riparian corridor. The resulting overdraft will,
unless checked, inexorably extinguish the
stream and its rich riparian habitat. State law
has been inadequate to protect the riparian
corridor because the State has been slow to
recognize the connection between groundwater and surface water, and because the
area is outside the primary regulatory ambit
of the 1980 groundwater code.110
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ing “filing . . . a claim for the quantification
of such rights in any present or future appropriate stream adjudications.”112 The federal right has been asserted in the massive
Gila River general stream adjudication (filed
a quarter of a century ago), but the proceedings are going forward at a glacial pace.113
Still, the federal water rights, the presence
of endangered species and Fort Huachuca
make the national government a major
player in, and a proponent of, protecting the
stream and riparian corridor.

Formerly in private hands, the legacy
of a Mexican land grant, the riparian corridor is now in federal ownership as a result
of a three-way state/private/federal trade
engineered by then-Governor Babbitt in the
mid-1980s. In 1988, Congress made it the
nation’s first Riparian National Conservation
Area, and it is now part of the Bureau of
Land Management’s National Landscape
Conservation System.111

Apparently frustrated with the pace of
the adjudication, last year Congress
stepped in again, with a little-noticed provision buried in the 2004 National Defense
Authorization Act.114 On the one hand, it
clarified that the consultation process of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act did
not require consideration of water consumption by non-federal entities outside Fort
Huachuca, in determining whether federal
groundwater pumping would be likely to
jeopardize endangered species.115 On the
other hand, and more important, it directed
the Secretary of the Interior to “prepare . . .
a report on water use management and conservation measures that have been implemented and are needed to restore and
maintain the sustainable yield of the regional aquifer by and after September 30,
2011.”116 The report, due by the end of this
calendar year, is to:

The federal legislation expressly reserves water as a matter of federal law to
protect the riparian corridor. It also contains
the unusual command to the Secretary of
the Interior to “take steps necessary to protect” federally reserved water rights, includ-

set forth measurable annual goals
for the reduction of the overdrafts
of the groundwater of the regional
aquifer, to identify specific water
use management and conservation measures to facilitate the

109. See GLENNON, supra note 6, at 51-69.
110. See, e.g., RIBBON OF LIFE, supra note 108.
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 460xx-6 (2000) [San Pedro

Riparian National Conservation Area].
112. Id. § 460xx-1(d).

113. See supra note 101.
114. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 321, 117 Stat.

1392, 1437-39 (2003).
115. Id. § 321(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 1437.
116. Id. § 321(c)(1), 117 Stat. at 1438.
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achievement of such goals, and to
identify impediments in current
Federal, State, and local laws that
hinder efforts . . . to mitigate water usage in order to restore and
maintain the sustainable yield of
the regional aquifer by and after
September 30, 2011.117
The report is supposed to set out the “net
quantity of water withdrawn from and recharged to the regional aquifer” in the most
recent one-year period,118 identify annual
overdraft reduction goals each year from
2005 through 2011 “to achieve sustainable
yield,”119 and contain an “allocation of responsibility for the achievement of such reduction among” water users in the basin.120
It must also address monitoring and verification activities, and provide for annual
progress reports.121 While Congress did not
mandate that the recommendations in the
report be implemented as a matter of federal law, it expressed the “sense of Congress”
that “any future appropriations” of federal
money to the local water management partnership “should take into account whether
the partnership has met its annual goals for
overdraft reduction.”122
Here, Congress has combined the carrot and the stick. Interestingly, it does not
rely on federal claims of water rights, even
though the San Pedro has an express federal water right. The “stick” of choice here is
instead the threat of enforcement of federal
regulatory laws like the ESA. This may be
because the ESA is so powerful where listed
117. Id. § 321(c)(2), 117 Stat. at 1438.
118. Id. § 321(c)(3)(A), 117 Stat. at 1438.
119. Id. § 321(c)(3)(B), 117 Stat. at 1438.
120. Id. § 321(c)(3)(C), 117 Stat. at 1438.
121. Id. § 321(d), 117 Stat. at 1438-39.
122. Id. § 321(f), 117 Stat. at 1439.
123. In many situations there may be enough

of a federal connection to groundwater overdraft
18

endangered species are affected123 or perhaps because the process of identifying,
adjudicating, and enforcing Winters rights is
so long, complex and expensive. The San
Pedro experience also suggests that the assertion of a Winters property right may be
less politically palatable to state and local
interests than the assertion of federal regulatory authority. Indeed, the Winters doctrine
— the principal basis for federal water rights
— has long caused substantial state discomfiture.124 It may be that in some, perhaps many circumstances, states may be
more accepting of federal regulation than
they are of federal assertion of property
rights in natural resources they see as within
their purview.
Finally, the San Pedro may also illustrate, in the end, that solutions may not
come easily. The ESA may drive the process, but ultimately further federal carrots
might be necessary, in the form of funds for
measurement and scientific modeling, for
conservation, for water reuse, and for plumbing facilities both to better manage local
supplies and, possibly, to import supplies
from outside.
V. Conclusion
As Aldous Huxley said, facts do not
cease to exist simply because they are ignored.125 The nation and its constituent
states have not fully faced up to serious
groundwater problems. Robert Glennon’s
stories of depletion of groundwater and associated surface water are grim reminders

to trigger the ESA section 7 consultation process. This can be a more accessible tool than the
direct enforcement of “take” of endangered species under section 9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
124. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 781-866, esp. 815-17.
125. Aldous Huxley, A Note on Dogma, in PROPER
STUDIES 205 (1927). The quotation is available at
http://www.quotationspage.com/subjects/facts
(last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
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of a resource in trouble.126 Droughts of recent years — possibly long-term, possibly
exacerbated by humanly induced climate
change — is leading to more groundwater
extraction, more depletion, and more adverse effects on surface water rights and
ecosystems.
Grappling with these questions is not
easy. Groundwater management can be
staggeringly complex, as anyone can attest
who has ever waded through page after
page of mind-numbing detail in the Arizona groundwater code, 127 or struggled
with the definition of “not-nontributary
groundwater” along Colorado’s Front
Range.128 While the scientific, technical
and legal challenges are daunting, there is
room for optimism, if the federal government is willing to assume a more active
role. There is much at stake.

126. GLENNON, supra note 6, passim.
127. See sources cited in SAX ET AL., supra note

2, at 428.
128 . See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-90103(10.7) (2004); SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 361.
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